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I n  t h e  U . S . ,  u n l i k e  m u c h  o f  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  t h e  m i x i n g  of  banking  and 
commerce is largely prohibited.   One exception is industrial loan companies (ILCs),  state 
chartered depository institutions some of which  are owned by commercial parents. In 
2006, the FDIC put a moratorium on the chartering of new ILCs pending resolution of a 
controversy sparked by Wal-Mart's application to start up an ILC in Utah.  Wal-Mart 
subsequently withdrew its bid.  This paper reviews the major arguments that have been 
raised against the mixing of banking and commerce, finding most to be theoretically weak 
or lacking in empirical support, and discusses several efficiencies that may arise from the 





1.  Introduction 
Beginning with the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, banking has largely been 
kept separate from commerce in the United States.  While the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999 lifted Glass-Steagall’ s prohibitions on banks engaging in insurance and securities 
underwriting,  the  wall  separating  traditional  banking  from  commerce  remains.    For 
example, a soap manufacturer cannot own a bank, or vice versa.  One notable breach in 
the wall involves industrial loan corporations (ILCs).  These are depository institutions 
that, although chartered at the state level, have access to federal deposit insurance and 
are subject to FDIC oversight.  Some ILCs are owned by commercial parents, such as 
GMAC, Target and GE Capital.  In 2005, Wal-Mart’ s application for an ILC charter raised 
a storm of opposition from a number of quarters.  The FDIC instituted a moratorium in 
2006 on the chartering of new ILCs, pending review of the concerns raised by Wal-
Mart’ s application, and has since extended the moratorium. 
This paper reviews and evaluates some of the main issues raised in the ILC debate. 
 At the outset, it is useful to parse the concerns raised by ILCs into two categories.  First, 
ILCs are accorded different regulatory treatment from traditional banks.  Abstracting for 
the moment from the question of whether mixing banking and commerce is inherently 
problematic, the asymmetric treatment of two categories of financial institution raises 
issues of its own.  There are two such asymmetries: unlike traditional banks, ILCs (1) are 
not  subject  to  consolidated  supervision,  and  (2)  are  permitted  t o  m i x  b a n k i n g  a n d  
commerce.  Asymmetric treatment can give rise to “ regulatory arbitrage,”  in which 
resources flow from one part of the economy to another to take advantage of an artificial 
regulatory distinction.  Greenspan (2006) summarizes the point: 
 
“ The application of important public policies—such as those governing the 
proper  mixing  of  banking  and  commerce  and  the  role  of  consolidated 
supervision of banking organizations—should not depend on the location of 2 
 
a banking institution’ s charter or the particular nomenclature used to 
i d e n t i f y  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n .   R a t h e r ,  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  s h o u l d  b e  d e c ided  by 
Congress  after  a  full  and  careful  evaluation  and  then  applied  to  all 
organizations.”  
  
If, on balance, mixing banking and commerce is good for the financial system and the 
economy, then regulatory arbitrage that exploits the ILC “ loophole”  tends to advance 
economic efficiency.  But in this case efficiency could arguably be furthered by permitting 
all banking organizations to engage in commerce, not just ILCs.  On the other hand, if 
mixing banking and commerce is detrimental to efficiency, then arguably ILCs should be 
subject to the same prohibition as traditional banks. 
Hereafter, I set aside issues of asymmetric regulation and regulatory arbitrage to 
focus discussion on the more fundamental question of whether banking should be kept 
s e p a r a t e  f r o m  c o m m e r c e .   I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c o n s i d e r  a  s e t t i n g  i n  w hich  all  banking 
organizations, including ILCs, are subject to consolidated supervision.  What would be the 
effect of permitting banking organizations to engage in commerce, subject to antitrust 
review, as compared with a blanket prohibition on such mixing? 
The second category of ILC concerns goes directly to this question.  I evaluate 
three main concerns that have been raised about allowing banking and commerce to mix: 
 
   Ownership ties with a commercial firm may lead a bank to foreclose 
competition by denying loans to rivals of its commercial affiliate. 
   Deposit insurance is underpriced, yielding a subsidy.  Ownership ties 
might allow an insured bank to export the subsidy to its commercial affiliate, 
thereby expanding the aggregate subsidy. 
   Ownership ties would subject banks to the risks of their commercial 
affiliates, worsening the informational burden facing consolidated supervisors 
and threatening the stability of the financial system. 
 3 
 
These concerns are reviewed in Section 2.  Section 3 briefly discusses some of the 
potential benefits of permitting vertical integration between banking and commerce.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Concerns with Mixing Banking and Commerce 
2.1  Foreclosing Competition  
Two concerns involving competition have been raised with regard to the integration 
of banking and commerce.  The first is that banks may lend to their subsidiaries or 
parents on favorable or “ competitively unequal”  terms, creating an unlevel playing field 
among commercial borrowers.  The second is that banks may altogether deny funds to the 
rivals of their commercial subsidiaries or parents, thereby foreclosing competition if the 
rivals lack good alternative sources of credit.   
With regard to the first concern, so long as commercial rivals have good alternative 
sources of credit, concerns with “ competitive inequality”  in lending are misplaced.  Not 
only  is  there  nothing  objectionable  about  a  firm  treating  the  internal  movement  of 
resources between divisions or affiliates differently from arm’ s length transactions, such 
differential treatment is essential to achieving efficiencies from vertical integration. 
Coase (1937) first posed the question of why some transactions are organized 
within firms while others are carried out across markets.  The answer, fundamentally, is 
that transactions tend to be organized in whatever way maximizes the gains from trade for 
the parties to the transaction.  The closer coordination afforded within a firm may help to 
minimize transaction costs or foster incentives for the parties to undertake investments 
customized to their particular business relationship. 
A simple example suffices to illustrate the broader point.  Consider a bank that has 
significant market power in a local commercial loan market—though not so significant as 
to enable the bank to foreclose competition among commercial borrowers.  The bank’ s 
market power will tend to be reflected in above-competitive interest rates the bank 4 
 
charges on commercial loans negotiated at arm’ s length.  Such high loan margins can 
generate inefficiencies, to the extent that they restrict the quantity of credit commercial 
borrowers obtain below what borrowers would demand at competitive loan rates. 
If the bank then vertically integrates with a commercial borrower, inefficiencies in 
their credit transactions could be eliminated and joint profits  increased by transferring 
credit within the integrated firm at the firm’ s cost of funds.  As a consequence, the 
commercial affiliate would obtain additional funding from the financial parent.  Final 
consumers  would  tend  to  benefit  from  such  credit  expansion.    For  example,  the 
commercial affiliate might use the additional credit to fund a capital upgrade that lowers 
marginal cost or improves product quality.  Although such changes put rivals of the 
commercial affiliate at some competitive disadvantage, consumers of the product tend to 
benefit through lower market prices or improved quality. 
Turning to the second competitive concern, consider the case of a bank with 
substantial market power in commercial loans, sufficient to foreclose competition by 
denying credit to rivals of its commercial affiliate.  By raising downstream rivals’  credit 
costs, a foreclosure of competition accomplished through vertical integration could cause 
significant harm, as reflected in higher prices or lower quality in the downstream market. 
One indication of the extent of competition in a market is the level of concentration 
among suppliers.
1  A common measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).  The HHI can range from an upper value of 10,000, for the case of a single supplier 
with 100% market share, down to zero, as the number of suppliers expands without limit 
and individual shares decline toward zero.
2  Table 1 below reports HHI statistics for 
banking markets as defined by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).
3 
                                                 
1 For a more complete discussion of issues important to competition analysis, see U.S. Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, revised April 8, 1997. It is important to note 
that there are conceptual differences between the way the Federal Reserve defines banking markets and the 
Guidelines approach to market definition. The use of FRB markets in Table 1 is convenient because the data 
is readily available in this form. 
2 The HHI is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of market participants. 
3 Where shares are measured by deposits held at local bank branches. 5 
 
 
  Table 1:  Concentration in FRB Banking Markets 
   Rural  Urban  All 
HHI 
  Mean  2957  1807  2657 
  Median  2509  1578  2230 
 
Organizations 
  Mean  6.9  21.6  10.8 
  Median  7  6  1 5  
 
# Markets  1202  424  1626 
Source:  Laderman and Pilloff (2007); data as of June 2001. 
 
As Table 1 indicates, rural banking FRB markets tend to be more concentrated than 
urban ones.  The median HHI of 2509 for rural FRB markets is equivalent to market 
participation by four symmetric banking organizations, each of which has 25% share of the 
local market.  Shares are typically not symmetric, however.  The median number of 
banking organizations participating in rural FRB markets is in fact seven.  In contrast, the 
median urban HHI of 1578 is roughly equivalent to market participation by six symmetric 
banking organizations, each of which has 16% share. 
Table 1 suggests that if, hypothetically, a banking organization in a rural FRB 
market were to vertically integrate and subsequently deny credit to the local rivals of its 
commercial affiliate, these rivals would typically have three to six alternative bank lenders 
to which they could turn.
4  In such circumstances, attempting to foreclose rivals appears 
unlikely to be an effective or profitable strategy for a vertically integrated bank. 
This is not to say that there can never be legitimate foreclosure concerns arising 
from the vertical merger of a bank and a commercial firm.  But neither are foreclosure 
concerns limited to the banking industry.  The relevant question is whether the risk of 
                                                 
4 An important caveat is that market shares based on local deposits may not adequately reflect banks’  
competitive significance in extending commercial loans. 6 
 
vertical  foreclosure  is  especially  acute  in  banking,  so  much  more  so  than  in  other 
industries as to trump antitrust review and warrant a blanket prohibition on the mixing of 
banking and commerce.  The answer is “ no.”   In comparison with many other industries, 
banking  appears  neither  exceptionally  concentrated  nor  unusually  susceptible  to 
foreclosure risks. 
 
2.2  Expanding the Safety Net Subsidy  
A commonly voiced concern with mixing banking and commerce is that deposit 
insurance is underpriced, conferring a subsidy on banks, and that vertical integration 
could allow “ the safety net subsidy to trickle out of a bank”
5 into the coffers of its 
commercial affiliates, thereby expanding the aggregate subsidy.  This concern raises two 
questions.    Is  deposit  insurance  in  fact  underpriced?    If  it  is,  how  would  vertical 
integration affect efficiency given the subsidy? 
 
Is Deposit Insurance Underpriced? 
Merton (1977) showed that the actuarially fair insurance premium can be estimated 
using the Black-Scholes options pricing formula, by treating deposit insurance as a put 
option on a bank’ s loan portfolio.  Applying this technique to 1979-80 data, Marcus and 
Shaked (1984) find that deposit insurance assesses a tax on banks, rather than a subsidy. 
 Epps, Pulley and Humphrey (1996) obtain the same result using 1989 data.  Whalen 
(1997), using 1996 data, estimates a small deposit insurance subsidy of between zero and 
30 basis points.  Once offsetting regulatory costs are factored in, however, Whalen (1997) 
suggests that deposit insurance may impose a net tax on banks.
6  As Gorton and Rosen  
                                                 
5 Krainer (2000). 
6 As Walter (1998) has noted,however, Whalen (1997) estimates the total regulatory costs facing FDIC 
insured banks, whereas only the marginal costs of regulation are relevant to loan extension decisions.  
Breaking out regulatory costs into fixed versus variable components is difficult, but fixed costs appear to 
predominate.   7 
 
(1995) conclude, “ empirical research has not reached a consensus on whether deposit 
insurance is underpriced.”  
 
Would Vertical Integration Export a Subsidy?   
The “ trickling out”  of any deposit insurance subsidy from banks to commercial 
firms occurs even in the absence of ownership ties.  Insured deposits are banks’  primary 
input into the production of loanable funds.  In a competitive industry, an industry-wide 
reduction in marginal cost is fully passed through to consumers in the form of lower 
output prices.  Even a monopolist facing a downward-sloping, linear demand will find it 
profit-maximizing to pass along half of any marginal cost savings.  Thus it seems likely 
that under the current regulatory regime much or all of any safety net subsidy is already 
trickling out to commercial borrowers.  If banks supply commercial loans competitively, 
any subsidy would be fully passed through; vertical integration would engender no further 
trickling. 
To the extent that banks exercise market power in commercial loans,
7 however, 
vertical integration would tend to expand a bank’ s lending to commercial affiliates by 
eliminating the bank’ s markup on interest rates charged internally for loans.  This 
prospect is sometimes decried as favoritism that would create an unlevel playing field in 
the  downstream  industry,  but  it  is  more  properly  viewed  as  a  potential  efficiency.  
Whether it is in fact an efficiency depends on the relative magnitudes of the safety net 
subsidy and the bank’ s margin on external loans.  A subsidy tends to depress loan rates 
below the socially efficient level, while an exercise of market power tends to elevate 
rates above this level.  How loan rates compare with the social optimum depends on the 
relative magnitudes of these countervailing effects. 
The available evidence suggests that the safety net subsidy may be small, while 
market power in commercial lending may in some circumstances be significant.  If the 
market power effect predominates, so that loan rates are above the social optimum on 8 
 
balance, vertical integration would tend to improve efficiency by lowering loan rates. 
If, on the other hand, the subsidy effect predominates, so that loan rates are 
inefficiently low, vertical integration would tend to worsen matters by further lowering 
rates.  In this case, however, prohibiting integration would not be the best way to deal 
with the problem of excessively low loan rates.  Maintaining regulatory restrictions to 
limit the banking industry’ s output would be an oddly roundabout way to counter the 
expansionary effects of a subsidy.  A more direct approach would be to eliminate the 
subsidy, by pricing deposit insurance at the actuarially fair premium. 
 
2.3  Weakening Financial System Stability  
As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above, the first two concerns with the mixing 
of banking and commerce are, upon examination, quite weak.  In contrast, the third 
concern raises thornier issues. Allowing banking and commerce to mix would “ make 
banks susceptible to the reputational, operational, and financial risks of their [commercial] 
affiliates”  (Kohn, 2007).  Further, commercial activities “ provide a host of ways for 
[banking] firms to increase risk”  (Krainer, 2000). 
Banks are, of course, already susceptible to the risks facing their commercial 
borrowers.  A bank’ s exposure to risk is currently limited, however, to non-repayment 
of outstanding loans.  For an integrated bank, the insolvency of a commercial affiliate 
could  have  graver  consequences  for  its  own  financial  standing.    Moreover,  vertical 
integration with a commercial firm would give a bank a wider variety of hiding places in 
which to book poorly performing assets.  All of this suggests that allowing banking and 
commerce to mix would require a consolidated supervisor to conduct more probing 
oversight  of  balance  sheets  and  develop  greater  expertise  in  assessing  risks  in 
commercial ventures.  
                                                                                                                                                             
7 For some evidence on this point, see Hannan (1991) and Sapienza (2002). 9 
 
On some dimensions, vertical integration clearly would increase a consolidated 
supervisor’ s informational burden.  But it could lessen the burden in other ways.  The 
oversight costs facing a consolidated supervisor depend on two categories of risk.  The 
first is the fundamental riskiness, observable to the supervisor, of the types of activities 
in which banks are permitted to engage.  The second is the severity of moral hazard 
problems with respect to aspects of risk that are observable to banks but not to the 
supervisor.  The aggregate (observable) risk of a bank’ s asset portfolio can be reduced 
through diversification, while the severity of moral hazard can be reduced by increasing 
the equity capital banks have at stake.  Vertical integration may help on both counts, as 
discussed presently. 
The net effect of vertical integration on financial system stability is thus not clear 
as a matter of theory.  Ultimately, it is an empirical question.  One set of empirical results 
suggests that vertical integration bolsters financial stability.  In their cross-country study, 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) find that financial systems tend to be less stable where 
banks  face  greater  regulatory  restrictions  on  their  ability  to  engage  in  commercial 
activity. 
 
Allowing Portfolio Diversification 
Saunders and Yourougou (1990), using stock return data for the period 1977-1981, 
find evidence that banks are “ special”  in the sense that their stock returns are more 
sensitive to changes in monetary policy than are the returns to commercial firms.  This 
suggests that part of the interest rate risk banks face is diversifiable. 
More generally, an investment portfolio that efficiently trades off risk and return 
would include a diversified mix of assets from sectors other than banking.  Wall, Reichert 
and Liang (2007), using data on corporate tax returns over the period 1994-2002, find 
that the average return on assets for bank holding companies could be doubled—from 1% 
to 2%—with no increase in risk, by investing in a portfolio having 55% asset value in 
banking, 14% in retail, 13% in nonbank financial services, 8% in wholesale, and 6% in 10 
 
construction.  This suggests that tearing down the wall that separates banking from 
commerce could, by allowing diversification, lower banks’  portfolio risks and so tend to 
limit risks facing the financial system.  
 
Lessening Moral Hazard 
The  need  for  active  supervision  declines  as  prudential  investment  becomes 
incentive-compatible.  One possible reform, as already discussed, would be to price 
deposit  insurance  at  the  actuarially  fair  level  to  eliminate  any  subsidy,  given  that 
subsidized insurance tends to encourage excessive risk taking.  Vertical integration also 
has the potential to reduce moral hazard, in two ways.  First, permitting integration would 
tend to raise bank profits, making bankruptcy liquidation more costly to holders of bank 
equity.  Second, mixing commerce with banking would expose banks to the reputational 
capital of their commercial affiliates, which would subject holders of commercial equity to 
the costs of bank liquidation. 
 
Raising Bank Profits 
The present value of a bank charter is the expected stream of rents accruing to 
operations permitted under the charter.  Broadening the scope of permitted operations 
may raise or lower charter value.  A broadened scope of operations can increase the 
surplus generated by banking relationships, but if it also intensifies bank competition then 
banks will capture a smaller share of the surplus.  The net effect of the deregulatory 
changes of recent decades, such as permitting banks to operate multiple branches and 
across state lines, has been to lower bank profits and devalue bank charters. 
A bank charter is like a posted bond, forfeitable upon bankruptcy liquidation, that 
limits the bank’ s willingness to undertake risky ventures (Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 
1986).  Keeley (1990) finds cross-sectional evidence that banks with less market power 
tend to carry riskier loans on their books.  The sharpening of bank competition that has 
resulted  from  past  deregulation  may  thus  have  worsened  moral  hazard  problems in 11 
 
lending. 
Rolling back deregulation to restrict bank competition, as a means of lessening 
moral hazard, is neither a practical nor desirable option.  Extending deregulation to permit 
vertical integration between banks and commercial firms, on the other hand, would tend to 
raise bank profits while advancing economic efficiency by improving coordination between 
banks and commercial borrowers.  The findings of cross-country studies are consistent 
with this conclusion: bank profits tend to be higher, all else equal, where restrictions on 
banks engaging in commercial activity are weaker (e.g., Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001; 
Shen and Chang, 2006; Vander Vennet, 2002).  This suggests that allowing banking and 
commerce to mix in the U.S. might lessen moral hazard problems by increasing the value 
of bank charters. 
 
Tapping the Reputational Capital of Commercial Firms 
Allowing banking and commerce to mix would provide banks with opportunities to 
tap  into  the  reputational  capital  of  well  established  commercial  f i r m s .   W h i l e  t h e  
insolvency of a commercial affiliate could have grave consequences for a bank, the 
converse is also true: a bank’ s insolvency could gravely affect its commercial affiliate.  
Suppose, for example, that a prominent retailer such as Wal-Mart is allowed to own a 
bank and proceeds to set up branches within its stores, creating more opportunities for 
“ o n e  s t o p  s h o p p i n g . ”   T h e  i n t e g r a t e d  b a n k ’ s  c u s t o m e r s  w o u l d  t y p ically  also  be 
customers of the retailer’ s other products and services.  If the bank were to become 
insolvent, with depositors experiencing disruptions in service, the retailer’ s overall 
reputation would be at risk.  A retailer with a well established reputation would have 
powerful incentives to avoid this contingency. 
The  wall  separating  banking  from  commerce  limits  the  ways  in  which  the 
economy’ s  stock  of  reputational  capital  can  be  efficiently  harnessed.    Permitting 
commercial equity holders to subject themselves to the risks facing banks might relax the 





3.  Potential Benefits of Mixing Banking and Commerce 
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on efficiencies that can arise 
with integration between a buyer and seller.  Among other things, vertical integration may 
reduce  transaction  costs  or  improve  incentives  for  relationship-specific  investment.  
P e r m i t t i n g  b a n k i n g  a n d  c o m m e r c e  t o  m i x  m a y  l i k e w i s e  g e n e r a t e  e f ficiencies  in  the 
provision of financial services to commercial firms.  Some of these potential efficiencies 
have already been discussed, such as (1) eliminating a double markup when the bank and 
commercial firm each have market power in their respective markets, (2) increasing 
portfolio diversification, and (3) lessening moral hazard by enhancing the value of bank 
charters.  This section, while far from exhaustive, discusses some other efficiencies that 
may flow from the integration of banking and commercial activities. 
 
Reducing Transaction Costs 
Permitting  vertical  integration  between  banking  and  commerce  might  lower 
transaction costs in a number of ways.  In its 2005 application to charter an ILC, for 
example, Wal-Mart claimed that it could realize substantial cost savings (in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars) by taking the processing of credit and debit card transactions in-
house.  Currently,  Wal-Mart  has  an  arrangement  with  First  Data  to  perform  such 
processing.  Setting aside the claimed magnitude of potential savings, it is plausible that a 
large retail firm could achieve benefits by processing transactions internally.  Doing so 
may, for example, allow for a degree of customization of transaction capture at the point 
of sale and back-office transaction routing that could be more difficult to accomplish when 
a retailer deals at arm’ s length with an independent data processing firm. 
Second, consumers often seek to lower their transaction costs through one-stop-13 
 
shopping, as attested by the popularity of retail superstores and shopping malls.  These 
benefits extend to the collocation of banking services alongside retail goods.  Adams, 
Avery and Borzekowski (2008) study the deposit growth of banks that enter a geographic 
market by locating within a Wal-Mart store, as compared with banks that enter a market 
by other means.  They find that banks located within Wal-Mart stores experience more 
rapid and sustained growth in deposits.  While these bank branches are not owned by 
Wal-Mart, the Adams, Avery and Borzekowski (2008) empirical results are at least 
suggestive of the possibility that the closer coordination that ownership ties would afford 
might lead to even more effective exploitation of the one-stop-shopping benefits of 
adding financial services to the retail mix.
8 
Third, an internal capital market, created through the vertical integration of a bank 
with commercial firms, can also reduce transaction costs.  Haubrich and Santos (2005) 
show that an internal capital market facilitates the disposition of assets seized in a loan 
default; asymmetries in information about asset quality can render such assets less liquid 
on an open market. 
 
Monitoring Credit Worthiness 
Allen and Berger (1995) find that small business borrowers with longer banking 
relationships tend to pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral.  This 
is consistent with the view that lending relationships generate valuable information about 
borrower quality.  One mechanism through which such information may be generated is 
the lender’ s ability to directly view the borrower’ s inflows and outflows of cash when a 
line of credit is linked to a merchant banking account.  Control rights could further a 
bank’ s ability to monitor the credit worthiness of a commercial affiliate.   
 
                                                 
8 In the face of vocal opposition to Wal-Mart’ s ILC application from the Independent Community Bankers 
Association, the retailer denied having any intention to eventually use its ILC to roll out in-store bank 
branches . 14 
 
Exploiting Bank Reputational Capital 
Allowing banking and commerce to mix might allow commercial firms to benefit 
from banks’  reputational capital.  This is well illustrated by the record of securities 
underwriting by banks, which was permitted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are typically underpriced relative to the market value 
the stock attains shortly after the initial offering, yielding unusually high returns to initial 
investors.  Firms that go public to raise capital are typically better informed of their 
prospects for success than are stock market investors.  This gives rise to a lemons 
problem.  Private firms with poorer than average prospects might especially gain from 
going public, cashing in with an IPO before information about the stock’ s true value is 
fully revealed to the market.  On this view, IPO underpricing represents a discount 
demanded by wary investors.
9 
Schenone (2004) finds that underpricing is less severe
10 for IPOs managed by banks 
that have a pre-IPO relationship with the firm going public.  Through an ongoing lending 
relationship, a bank obtains information about a firm’ s credit risk.  This information is 
also valuable in assessing the quality of the firm’ s IPO.  Schenone (2004) posits that a 
bank managing an IPO for a firm with which it has a pre-existing relationship can credibly 
                                                 
9 Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) develop models in which IPO 
underpricing is a credible way for a firm to signal its quality to investors. 
10 By about 17%. 15 
 
convey its private information about IPO quality to investors.
11 
The smaller extent of IPO underpricing for bank-managed IPOs appears to reflect 
the  realization  of  a  scope  economy  between  securities  underwriting  and  traditional 
banking due to more efficient exploitation of the bank’ s private information.  As a result 
of  this  scope  economy,  many  private  firms  have  gained  improved  access to capital 
markets through the option of going public, allowing these firms to proceed with profitable 
projects that otherwise would have gone unfunded.  Such improvement in the operation of 
the capital market spurs economic growth by facilitating innovation. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper has evaluated several concerns with permitting banking and commerce 
to mix, as well as several potential efficiencies.  The concerns involve the potential for 
such mixing to allow (1) competition to be foreclosed, (2) a deposit insurance subsidy to 
be expanded, and (3) financial system stability to be weakened.  Upon examination, 
concerns (1) and (2) are quite weak.  While it is possible that, in limited circumstances, a 
bank may find it profitable to foreclose rivals of its commercial affiliate by denying them 
credit, the risk of foreclosure is not especially great in banking as compared with other 
industries, and provides no justification for a blanket prohibition on vertical integration in 
banking.  With regard to a deposit insurance subsidy, the available evidence for its 
existence is mixed at best.  Moreover, ownership ties are not necessary for such a 
subsidy to be passed through to downstream firms—competition accomplishes this too.  
                                                 
11 Repeat dealing provides powerful market incentives for firms to deal honestly with customers.  The 
stream of profit a bank earns from managing IPOs is likely to be higher as a result of the bank’ s superior 
information about IPO quality, so long as IPO investors find the bank’ s claims credible.  If the bank were to 
cheat investors with a false claim that an IPO it is managing is high quality, the bank would stand to lose a 
stream of future profits from the lucrative IPO business. 16 
 
Even assuming that deposit insurance involves a subsidy and that vertical integration 
would  result  in  excessive  credit  expansion,  constricting  the  efficiency  of  banking 
relationships to limit output is not a good way to counter the subsidy’ s expansionary 
effects.  A better solution would be to raise deposit insurance premiums to the actuarially 
fair level. 
 The third concern merits deeper consideration.  Allowing banking and commerce to 
mix could subject banks to greater risks from the activities of their commercial affiliates, 
posing potential risks to the stability of the financial system.  The informational burden 
facing consolidated supervisors would become heavier in a number of respects.  However, 
vertical  integration  might  also  lighten  this  burden,  both  by  affording  banks  greater 
opportunities  to  diversify  risk  and  by  lessening  moral  hazard  problems.  Vertical 
integration would tend to mitigate bank moral hazard both by increasing the value of bank 
charters and by encouraging private monitoring of bank risks by commercial affiliates.  As 
a matter of theory, the net effect of vertical integration on financial system stability is not 
clear.  The available international evidence suggests, however, that financial systems are 
more stable in countries where restrictions on the mixing of banking and commerce are 
lower. 
If, on balance, vertical integration between banks and commercial firms were found 
to worsen the supervisory burdens facing bank regulators, these costs should be weighed 
against  the  potential  efficiency  gains  of  such  vertical  integration,  which  might  be 
substantial.  17 
 
Appendix 1:  Industrial Loan Corporations 
Beginning in the early 20
th century, ILCs were chartered under state laws as 
institutions that provided unsecured loans to industrial workers.  ILCs, along with other 
“ nonbank banks”  (such as unitary thrifts and credit card banks) that either did not take 
deposits  or  did  not  extend  commercial  loans,  were  exempt  from  the  Bank  Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (BHCA).  Thus ILCs were (and many remain) subject to neither the 
BHCA’ s requirement for consolidated supervision by a federal agency nor the BHCA’ s 
prohibitions on banks engaging in securities underwriting, insurance and commercial 
activities.  Originally, state laws prohibited ILCs from taking deposits, but this began to 
change in the 1950s.  In 1982, ILCs gained FDIC deposit insurance with the passage of the 
Garn-St. Germain Act.  This led to concerns that ILCs (and other nonbank banks) could 
access the federal safety net while avoiding the consolidated supervision of balance-sheet 
risks and prohibitions on business activity that the BHCA mandated for traditional banks.
12 
Critics have raised a number of concerns with ILCs’  exploitation of this regulatory 
“ loophole.”   As noted in the Introduction, it is important to distinguish two senses in 
w h i c h  I L C s  o p e r a t e  o u t s i d e  B H C A  m a n d a t e s .   T h e  f i r s t  i s  t h a t  F D IC-insured  ILCs, 
although operating under FDIC oversight, are not subject to consolidated supervision.  A 
consolidated supervisor, such as the Fed, Office of Thrift Supervision, or Comptroller of 
the Currency, has the authority to examine a bank holding company’ s books as well as 
those of any nonbank subsidiaries, regardless of whether any subsidiary has a business 
relationship with an insured bank within the holding company.  In contrast, the FDIC’ s 
authority to examine affiliates of an FDIC-insured bank is limited to what is necessary to 
disclose the affiliate’ s relationship to the bank and the effect of this relationship on the 
bank.  In particular, when there is no active business relationship between a bank and 
commercial affiliate, “ any reputation or other risk presented by an affiliate that could 
                                                 
12 This exception was largely closed in 1987 by the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA), which placed 
most FDIC-insured nonbank banks under the regulatory requirements of the BHCA.  However CEBA 
exempted FDIC-insured ILCs that met one of several criteria. 18 
 
impact the [FDIC-insured] institution may not be detected”  (GAO, 2005).  Thus while 
ILCs have the same access to the federal safety net as do traditional banks, they are 
arguably subject to weaker oversight, and so may pose a greater risk to financial system 
stability.  The second concern critics have raised is that ILCs, unlike traditional banks, are 
allowed to engage in commercial activities. 
 
Figure 1:  Number and Total Assets of ILCs 
 
Source: GAO analysis of FDIC call report data, as presented in Hillman (2006). 
 
ILCs remained small players in the banking industry for many decades, but as 
Figures 1 and 2 show, these institutions began to grow rapidly in the 1990s, in terms of 
both assets and insured deposits.  Between 1987 and 2006, ILC assets grew from less 
than $4 billion to more than $155 billion (Figure 1).  Deposits held by ILCs have grown 
sixfold since 1999.  ILC deposits represented far less than one percent of all FDIC-









Figure 2:  Percentage of Estimated FDIC Insured Deposits Held by ILCs 
 
Source: GAO analysis of FDIC call report data, as presented in Hillman (2006). 
 
About two-thirds of ILCs, comprising around 90% of ILC assets and deposits, are 
either independently owned or owned by large financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch, 
American Express and UBS.
13 The remaining ILCs are owned by large commercial and 
retail  firms  such  as  GMAC,  Target,  GE  Capital,  BMW  and  Volkswage n .   T h e s e  
commercially owned ILCs are used as financial arms by their parents in support of the 
parents’  main retail or commercial operations.
14 
To put matters into perspective, commercially owned ILCs held on the order of 
0.3% of FDIC-insured deposits in 2006. 
 
                                                 
13 Lloyd (2008), citing an analysis by the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutions.  The financial parents 
of ILCs use their ILCs to service brokerage accounts and extend loans backed by securities. 
14 Ibid. 20 
 
Appendix 2:  Bank Competition and Manufacturer Entry 
One set of empirical findings merits particular note because it is suggestive of 
competitive concerns that might arise with vertical integration in banking.  Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2006) study a panel dataset of manufacturing establishments over the period 
1977 to 1994.  They find that, in manufacturing sectors that tend to be highly dependent 
on external finance,
15 intensified bank competition in the wake of banking deregulation 
spurred entry of manufacturing establishments into local markets, increasing the number 
of such establishments by 11.6%.  They also find that a reduction in bank concentration, 
from an HHI of 2400 down to 1400, is associated with a 4.6% increase in the number of 
external-finance-dependent manufacturing establishments operating in a local market.
16  
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) cite a possible explanation for these empirical patterns: 
 
“ The value of a bank’ s current lending relationships will depend on the 
future profitability of its borrowers, which in turn depends on prospective 
entry and growth of new competitors.  A bank’ s incentive to support the 
profitability of its older clients could thus restrain its willingness to extend 
credit to potential industry entrants ... The less competitive the conditions in 
the  credit  market,  the  lower  the  incentive  for  lenders  to  finance 
newcomers.”  
 
The potential for the mixing of banking and commerce to result in foreclosure is not 
directly  addressed  by  Cetorelli  and  Strahan’ s  (2006)  empirics.    If,  however,  the 
theoretical interpretation of their results presented in the quote above is correct, then it is 
plausible that vertical integration may harden a bank’ s unwillingness to finance entry by 
newcomers who would compete with the bank’ s commercial affiliate. 
One shortcoming of Cetorelli and Strahan’ s (2006) analysis is that it takes no 
account of the geographic scope of manufacturing industries.  Their unit of analysis is a 
                                                 
15 The extent of financial dependence on banks depends in part on industry-specific technological factors 
such as capital intensity, scale economies and the gestation and cash-harvest periods of projects (Rajan and 
Zingales,1998). 21 
 
state in a given year; they find that states with lower mean concentration in local banking 
markets
17 have a somewhat larger number of external-finance-dependent manufacturing 
establishments per capita.  To interpret this result as reflecting a foreclosure effect from 
bank concentration, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) implicitly assume that manufacturing 
markets are no larger than states.  But many manufacturing markets are in fact regional, 
national or even international in scope.
18 
To see the nature of the problem, suppose that the interest rates banks charge on 
commercial loans tend to increase with local bank concentration.  In the long run, small 
manufacturing businesses are mobile and some can be expected to migrate to states 
where  funding  costs  are  lower.    Such  migration  may  represent  exit  from  some 
manufacturing markets and entry into others.  Alternatively, the migration may occur 
within a given manufacturing market.  In the latter case, the competitive positions of 
established bank clients are unaffected, so identifying the business migration with a 
foreclosure effect would be inappropriate.  It is possible that Cetorelli and Strahan’ s 
(2006)  empirical  result  on  concentration  reflects  a  shift  in  the  distribution  of 
manufacturing establishments across state lines rather than a reduction in the number of 
rivals operating within any given manufacturing market. 
More fundamentally, if manufacturing markets do have fewer competitors where 
local bank concentration is higher upstream, one need not appeal to foreclosure to explain 
such a pattern.  The exercise of market power involves a restriction in quantity that 
raises price.  An exercise of market power by banks—restricting the availability of credit 
to  increase  its  price—may  result  in  a  higher  marginal  cost  or  lo w e r  q u a l i t y  o f  
manufactured goods downstream.  If so, the quantity of downstream goods demanded by 
consumers will tend to fall.  Given an optimal scale of production, a decrease in quantity 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 This finding is consistent the view that deposit-based HHIs have explanatory power for the intensity of 
competition in small business lending. 
17 Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) calculate a banking HHI for every metropolitan statistical area (MSA), then 
take a weighted average across MSAs within a state to obtain the state’ s HHI figure. 22 
 
demanded tends to reduce the number of manufacturing establishments in operation. 
Any  exercise  of  market  power  upstream  market  can  in  principle  have  such 
downstream effects, regardless of whether upstream firms have any ability to foreclose 
downstream competition.  Typically, a loss in competition downstream tends to harm 
upstream firms that have market power, cutting into their profits by worsening the 
problem of double marginalization. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 A manufacturing firm’ s dependence on local bank finance does not necessarily imply that in selling its 
product the firm faces competition primarily from local manufacturers. 23 
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